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Real Estate Insight
After Taming 'National Ruin Real Estate', a 'Housing Ladder' is Needed

This article was automatically translated by AI. There may be errors compared to the original Korean article.  Read original in Korean →

[비즈한국] Lee Jae-myung administration's real estate policy, a head-on collision between 'residential protection' and 'pressure on non-residential ownership' now begins.

The controversy surrounding President Lee Jae-myung's sale of his apartment in Bundang is not merely a personal asset disposal issue. This matter is a political event that concisely displays the direction, intensity, and priority of the new government's real estate policy. Regarding the background of President Lee putting his apartment in Bundang-gu, Seongnam, on the market on February 27, 2026, the Presidential Office explained that it was "to personally demonstrate the will to normalize the real estate market."

Administrative achievements in restoring the housing ladder in Seoul and the metropolitan area are more important than political self-congratulations over suppressing Gangnam and Bundang. Illustration=Generative AI
Administrative achievements in restoring the housing ladder in Seoul and the metropolitan area are more important than political self-congratulations over suppressing Gangnam and Bundang. Illustration=Generative AI

This apartment is 164㎡ (exclusive area) and was listed for 2.9 billion won, which the Presidential Office stated is a lower price than the previous year's actual transaction price and the current market price. However, as of February 28, the Presidential Office drew a line, stating that the sale has not been finalized and that there will be an official announcement after completion. President Lee himself also explained that "it was sold not for money, but to fulfill my responsibilities as a public official."

The reason this scene is important is not because of a single house in Bundang, but because the President has started to push policy messages through his own actions. There are broadly two ways a regime deals with real estate. One is to pressure the market with words, and the other is for the highest point of power to send signals to the market through symbolic actions.

This sales issue is closer to the latter. In other words, the new government has made it clear that it will proceed with the frame that "the policy direction is already set, and the President himself is no exception." This should not be seen as a mere event, but as a process of accumulating political justification for future combinations of tax, finance, and regulatory policies.

If so, what is the substance of the policy that this signal points to? First, the most obvious is the scheduled end of the capital gains tax surcharge deferral for multi-homeowners. Through an official announcement on February 12, the government nailed down that the capital gains tax surcharge deferral for multi-homeowners would end as scheduled on May 9, 2026. At the same time, it also put forward some supplementary measures, considering the reality of land transaction permit zones and houses where tenants reside.

For new adjustment target areas, if a sales contract is signed by May 9, the surcharge can be avoided if sold within 6 months from the contract date, and the mandatory actual residency requirement was deferred for houses being leased within a certain range. The core is simple. They will confirm the end of the deferral, but will only provide supplements to reduce market shocks and public inconvenience. This is also why the government emphasized the predictability and reliability of its policies.

President Lee Jae-myung's recent remarks go one step further. On February 26 and 27, the President stated, "We will create a situation where selling is more advantageous than holding for not only multi-homeowners but also 1-homeowners who are for investment or speculative purposes rather than actual residence," and predicted that "ultra-high-priced houses will bear burdens and regulations equivalent to those of advanced nations' capitals."

Also, at his New Year's press conference on January 21, he expressed a negative view on special long-term holding deductions for investment or speculative real estate. This is a very significant change. It means that the policy target is no longer staying only at the traditional multi-homeowner, but is expanding to non-resident 1-homeowners, ultra-high-priced 1-homeowners, and even long-term holding tax-saving structures.

However, one important clue should not be missed here. In the same January 21 press conference, President Lee also clearly revealed his recognition that a 1-homeowner for actual residence is a subject of protection. Remarks to the effect of "Housing is only for one house, and such one house must be protected" is a signal that the new government is not trying to make every 1-homeowner an enemy. Also, at the time, the President said, "As of now, I am not deeply considering implementing real estate policy through the tax system."

Regarding this attitude, the market is observing that selective pressure and symbolic measures will come out before an all-out war like broad property tax hikes, at least until the June 3 local elections. Ultimately, the axis of the policy is closer to 'actual residence protection' rather than '1-home protection', and conversely, closer to 'non-resident/high-priced holding regulation' rather than '1-home regulation'.

The fact that the President put his non-residential house on the market is symbolically powerful. However, supply and demand cannot be changed by symbols alone. Moreover, this house is known as Geumho Complex 1 in Yangji Village, Bundang, where expectations for the first phase of new town redevelopment are reflected. According to recent reports, this complex has a market price of around 2.9 billion won amid reconstruction expectations, and the entire Yangji Village reconstruction project is being mentioned as one of the largest maintenance projects in Bundang. Disposing of such an asset may have the effect of preemptively blocking conflicts of interest for public officials, but it does not immediately become a structural solution that changes the direction of the Bundang or Gangnam market.

Rather, what should be read through this issue is the new government's real estate philosophy. President Lee recently assessed that "signs of money tied up in real estate flowing into productive capital markets are encouraging," and mentioned the "dismantling of the ruinous real estate republic." These remarks are not mere rhetoric. The new government seems to be taking it as an overall goal of economic policy to take real estate off the main stage of asset growth and move funds to the financial market and productive investment.

In other words, real estate policy is not staying as housing policy, but is entering as part of capital allocation policy. From this perspective, the President's sale of his Bundang house is read more as a declaration that "political circles will no longer appear as beneficiaries of the real estate invincibility" than as a personal sale.

The problem starts here. The direction of returning funds from real estate to the capital market is understandable in terms of justification. However, the housing market is not the stock market. A house is an investment good and at the same time a living necessity, and the rental market, movement of actual demand, educational demand, proximity of work and home, retirement preparation, and generational division are intertwined at the same time. Therefore, the belief that the market can be normalized only by holding pressure is always dangerous.

Whether it is property tax, capital gains tax, or loan regulations, it can suppress the market, but it cannot create alternative housing. Taxes can change the direction of transactions, but they cannot compensate for the absence of supply. Governments that ignored this truth always declared victory after seeing downward stabilization immediately after policy announcements, only to face higher house prices and more severe jeonse (charter rent) anxiety a few quarters later.

If so, how will the Lee Jae-myung administration's next real estate policy unfold? First, there is a high possibility that policy operations to maximize the release of properties will continue until May 9. Ahead of the end of the capital gains tax surcharge deferral for multi-homeowners, they will lower transaction barriers somewhat through supplementary measures but will not make additional extensions that shake policy credibility. Second, it is highly likely that the criteria for regulation will be further segmented from 'number of houses' to 'actual residence, price level, and purpose of holding.' The President's remarks have already clearly pointed in that direction.

Third, non-resident 1-homeowners and ultra-high-priced 1-homeowners are likely to be the next targets. There is room for cards such as adjusting special long-term holding deductions, adjusting holding burdens for high-priced houses, and strengthening verification of actual residency to be reviewed. Fourth, it is highly likely that symbolic measures and selective pressure will come first before a comprehensive increase in property taxes before the local elections. This is directly connected to the political burden of the policy. Fifth, even if the market shakes, the government will not change the large frame of "actual residence protection, investment holding pressure."

Ultimately, this Bundang house sales issue has two faces. One is a desirable face. The attitude that the highest authority will not be an exception to the policy is definitely meaningful. The other is a dangerous face. The symbol is so strong that it can make the government mistakenly believe that it can solve structural problems with symbolic measures. House prices are not caught just by the President's decision. House prices move by the time of supply, quality of rent, predictability of tax, consistency of finance, differences in regional preferences, and, above all, whether the people can trust the government.

If the Lee Jae-myung administration truly wants to achieve a shift in real estate policy, it should not make this sales issue the peak of moral performance, but rather a starting point for sophisticated policy design. It should definitely protect 1-homeowners for actual residence, definitely make non-resident and speculative holdings disadvantageous, but must create breathing room in the rental and supply markets.

Administrative achievements in how to restore the housing ladder in Seoul and the metropolitan area are more important than political self-congratulations over suppressing Gangnam and Bundang. The real evaluation of this matter depends not on whether the President sold his house, but on whether the government leaves order instead of fear, and trust instead of slogans, in the market thereafter.

Kim Hak-ryeol, head of the Smart Tube Real Estate Research Institute, known by the pen name 'Pashong', served as the head of the Real Estate Research Division at Korea Gallup. He operates and hosts the Naver blog 'Pashong's World Exploration' and the YouTube channel 'Stu TV'. His books include 'Rewriting the Korean Real Estate User Manual (2025)', 'Power of Gyeonggi-do Real Estate (2024)', 'Absolute Principles of Seoul Real Estate (2023)', 'Future of Incheon Real Estate (2022)', 'Kim Hak-ryeol's Absolute Principles of Real Estate Investment (2022)', 'Korean Real Estate Future Map (2021)', and 'Only Places that will Rise, Rise from Now On (2020)'.

This article was automatically translated by AI. There may be errors compared to the original Korean article.
김학렬 스마트튜브 부동산조사연구소장

필명 빠숑으로 유명한 김학렬 스마트튜브 부동산조사연구소장은 한국갤럽조사연구소 부동산조사본부 팀장을 역임했다. 네이버 블로그 ‘빠숑의 세상 답사기’와 유튜브 ‘스튜TV’를 운영·진행하고 있다. 저서로 ‘3040 부린이 처음 부동산 투자(2026)’ ‘다시쓰는 대한민국 부동산 사용 설명서(2025)’ ‘경기도 부동산의 힘(2024)’ ‘서울 부동산 절대원칙(2023)’ ‘인천 부동산의 미래(2022)’ ‘김학렬의 부동산 투자 절대원칙(2022)’ ‘대한민국 부동산 미래지도(2021)’ ‘이제부터는 오를 곳만 오른다(2020)’ 등이 있다.

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