[비즈한국] Companies sometimes make decisions that are difficult to explain based solely on money. Understanding the laws and systems hidden within those decisions allows for a deeper understanding of the internal circumstances. 'Useful Business Tips' introduces clues that help in understanding business trends.

The keywords for fair trade enforcement under the new government are 'supporting the recovery of the livelihood economy' and 'creating a fair platform ecosystem.' Supporting the recovery of the livelihood economy refers to policies that protect the economic freedom of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-business owners. It can also be seen as a policy that strengthens the status of the economically vulnerable. Compared to other countries, South Korea has active discussions and a high volume of enforcement performance in this field.
Those who evaluate this positively say the following: Active discussion on correcting the relationship between 'Gap' and 'Eul' (superior and subordinate) is an indicator of South Korean society's democratization capacity and institutional development. They argue that the ruling power feels a sense of duty toward its campaign promises to institutionalize policies, and in that process, refines social discussions into legislation.
Of course, there are opposing opinions as well. They argue that state intervention in private transactions, regardless of the pretext, infringes upon the essence of private autonomy—which is based on self-regulation and creativity—and that the mission of the Fair Trade Act is to protect a free and fair competitive order, not to protect specific competitors (even if they are 'Eul').
While various political and academic discussions are emerging, anyone can intuitively understand the support for livelihood economic recovery as a basic direction for Fair Trade Act enforcement. Therefore, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has also immediately introduced concrete policies. These mainly relate to increasing personnel and expanding material facilities for swift case resolution. The plan includes: △strengthening personnel for handling cases in subcontracting, franchising, and distribution; △establishing a Gyeongin Office by separating the Gyeonggi and Incheon area tasks from the Seoul Office, considering the excessive case load at the Seoul Office; and △increasing deliberation personnel to resolve case processing delays caused by bottlenecks in deliberations.
In contrast, the concept of creating a fair platform ecosystem is abstract, making it unclear how regulations will be enforced in the future. So far, in the delivery app sector, where issues regarding commission burdens for micro-business owners and the self-employed are being raised, deliberations are underway regarding demands for most-favored-nation status, bundling, and deceptive advertising regarding estimated delivery times. It is currently at the stage of mentioning institutional improvements to resolve the platform non-payment issues revealed during the TMON and Wemakeprice (TMef) incident.
Although there is a social consensus on the necessity of platform regulation, the problem is that establishing criteria is not easy. Moreover, the court has recently issued rulings overturning the KFTC’s sanctions in several platform-related cases, placing an increasing burden on enforcement authorities.

A representative example is the 'N Shopping search algorithm case,' for which the Supreme Court handed down a remand decision on October 16, 2025, with the intent to overturn the KFTC's sanction. The outline of the case is as follows: The KFTC viewed that 'N' company had unfairly favored its own products and discriminated against open market products from other companies by adjusting its product search algorithm to display its own 'Smart Store' products more frequently. The KFTC argued that this reduced the exposure of other open market operators on Naver035420 Shopping, thereby limiting competition in the open market and causing unfair customer inducement that made it difficult for consumers to choose products.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal basis to require a market-dominant operator to treat other companies' services equally to its own when setting transaction terms. The Court also found no evidence that the company's actions led to a decrease in transaction volume or the number of vendors for competing open markets. Furthermore, it concluded that because new operators have continued to enter the open market and effective competition persists regardless of the search algorithm adjustments, it could not be considered as causing a restriction on competition.
Additionally, the Court held that a business operator has no obligation to disclose search algorithms to consumers or the outside world. It also ruled that since ordinary consumers with average transaction experience and attention span can recognize that search results are not displayed based on a comparison of product quality differences, the charge of unfair customer inducement is not established.
On May 22, 2025, the Seoul High Court also delivered a ruling overturning the KFTC’s sanction in the 'K Mobility dispatch algorithm case.' The KFTC had imposed corrective orders and fines, alleging that K Mobility had manipulated its algorithm to favor only its own affiliated taxis with dispatch assignments.
However, the Seoul High Court determined that while there was room for K Mobility's dispatch algorithm to operate in favor of affiliated taxis, there were reasonable grounds related to efficiency, such as alleviating ride shortages. Given that affiliated taxi operators were new entrants to the market, the court judged that it could not be seen as substantially restricting competition in the affiliated taxi service market.
The common principles revealed in these two rulings are as follows: ① It is not illegal for a platform not to disclose its algorithms. ② A restriction on competition must be concretely proven through factors such as a reduction in the number of business operators or a decrease in sales. ③ The intent to restrict competition must also be proven independently. In conclusion, the burden of proof on enforcement authorities has been significantly strengthened.
As such, the court is demanding very strict legal grounds and proof of anti-competitive effects regarding regulations in the platform market. This means that when the KFTC enforces its platform ecosystem policies in the future, it will be inevitable to establish more sophisticated criteria and develop advanced proof strategies.