[비즈한국] The development of ‘Block 1,’ the first phase of the KF-21 project, is cruising smoothly. While there are still 20 units remaining to be contracted out of the 40 scheduled for the Republic of Korea Air Force’s (ROKAF) Block 1 fleet, industry insiders are overwhelmingly optimistic about an additional contract. Against this backdrop, the UAE’s interest in the KF-21 is reportedly “beyond expectations,” drawing attention to which nation will become the first export destination for the aircraft.
Last February, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) 047810 announced that it is in export negotiations with seven countries and aims to be selected as the preferred bidder for the fighter jet procurement programs of two of those nations within this year. KAI declined to name specific countries due to negotiation security, but the disclosure that one of them is a "Middle Eastern nation" has piqued widespread curiosity.
The first candidate rumored to purchase the KF-21 within the year was Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had negotiated for participation in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a sixth-generation fighter project being jointly developed by the UK, Italy, and Japan. However, with Japan being lukewarm about their participation and the GCAP's operational timeline being far off, Saudi Arabia was seeking a more affordable fighter that could be purchased before the GCAP is introduced.
In fact, there was plenty of information suggesting negotiations with Saudi Arabia, including the existence of an "SA" version (the export-oriented KF-21) and KAI's local promotional presentations in the kingdom. Now, following the visit of the UAE Air Force delegation to South Korea on the 14th, interest has shifted toward whether the UAE will become the KF-21's "first export nation" due to their high level of interest.
On the 15th, Rashid Mohammed Al Shamsi, Commander of the UAE Air Force and Air Defense, held talks with ROKAF Chief of Staff Lee Young-su at Gyeryongdae, South Chungcheong Province, where they agreed to hold regular meetings between the two air forces. On the 16th, he visited KAI's office in Sacheon to inspect the KF-21 in person.
The UAE's interest in the KF-21 appears to go well beyond a simple site visit. The "Letter of Intent on Comprehensive Cooperation for the KF-21" signed during this trip includes provisions allowing the UAE Air Force to observe KF-21 training stages and visit relevant units. Azzan A. Ali Al Nuaimi, Commander of the Air Warfare and Missile Defense Center, even became a test pilot himself to board the KF-21 and conduct a test flight.
This is an unconventional measure by many standards; boarding an aircraft from another country that is still under development is a rarity in the history of fighter jet sales. Until now, no foreigner other than the test pilots from Indonesia, a co-development partner, had ever boarded the KF-21.
However, while the possibility of selling the KF-21 to the UAE has increased, it is too early to let our guard down. Just as Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto recently expressed interest in Turkey's KAAN fighter, the UAE has also shown interest in the joint development of the KAAN since last February. Originally, the UAE pursued the co-development of the Su-75 Checkmate, a fifth-generation export fighter from Russia's Sukhoi, but this plan was effectively abandoned due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Negotiations for the purchase of U.S. F-35 fighters were also publicly abandoned in September 2024.
The UAE is currently looking for a partner for both next-generation fighter force expansion and joint development. A three-way competition is underway between France, which has already exported 80 Rafale F4s to the UAE and aims to co-develop the Rafale F5; Turkey, which has proposed the KAAN; and South Korea, which has proposed the KF-21.
Nevertheless, it is a fact that the recent Letter of Intent and the UAE general’s flight in the KF-21 have significantly boosted the potential for a KF-21 export to the UAE. To win over the UAE—which has already experienced the Rafale and is looking for a fighter that offers better stealth performance than the Rafale while maintaining lower operational and acquisition costs—a strategy is needed that leverages the KF-21's competitive advantages while navigating delicate international relations.
To this end, we must first appeal to the KF-21's weapon capabilities—especially domestic armaments—which boast superior performance and functionality compared to the competing Rafale F4. Since the "Storm Shadow" missiles carried by Rafale jets have seen combat in the Ukraine war, we must accelerate the integration of the Cheonryong air-launched cruise missile (which can compete with the Storm Shadow), as well as supersonic air-to-ground missiles and air-launched ballistic missiles (ASBM), which France would find difficult to provide.
In terms of diplomacy, a strategy is needed that turns the fact that both the UAE and Indonesia are interested in Turkey's KAAN to our advantage. Since the UAE and Indonesia are both Islamic nations that emphasize strategic cooperation, if we propose a solution that benefits both countries rather than selling to only one, the export to the UAE could be resolved much more smoothly than expected.