[비즈한국] In the mid-term of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the defense command center has been reshuffled once again. While defense issues are at the center of political controversy more than in any previous administration, the reality is that there is a lack of actual problem-raising and discussion regarding the real defense issues that matter to us.
For this reason, I would like to briefly summarize the issues within our national defense—including the defense industry—that could catch us off guard, and discuss why these issues are becoming important and how they should be addressed as a form of 'preventive measure.' I have compiled a '3 Major Security Issues Checklist.'
The first issue concerns the reconstruction of overseas intelligence gathering. While the so-called "leak of Defense Security Command black agents" and issues related to lawsuits within the command have been making headlines daily, the focus has been only on the facts of the leak, with a lack of discussion on what to do moving forward.
In conclusion, overseas intelligence operations and the undisclosed personnel dispatched abroad for these tasks are currently working diligently in the field. This is because overseas intelligence operations have historically been carried out through a division of roles between the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Defense Security Command.
The problem is not that the undisclosed personnel—or "black agents"—currently engaged in overseas intelligence gathering have disappeared, but rather that the previously dual system of covert intelligence gathering by the NIS and the Defense Security Command has essentially been consolidated.
While overseas intelligence operations are called "operations," they effectively involve attempting and executing every action imaginable to acquire information. While spy operations in movies are often exaggerated, there is actually more omitted from the films than there is exaggerated. The reliability of intelligence and the timing of its acquisition depend on the methods and volume of data collected.
Furthermore, in overseas intelligence operations, not only is the volume of intelligence acquired important, but so is securing its reliability. The best way to prevent the compromise of such operations is to have separate, independent entities conduct operations without knowing each other's activities. Organizations with different personnel authorities possess vastly different tendencies and operational behaviors, which makes counter-intelligence tasks much more difficult for the adversary.
The issue is that if this reality is ignored and a single organization takes sole charge of overseas intelligence collection, it becomes easy for the adversary to conduct counter-tracking, manipulation, and counter-operations. The easiest and fastest way to increase the number of personnel for overseas operations—that is, "black agents"—is to consolidate the cultivation of overseas intelligence and covert operational agents under the NIS, but this is clearly a major mistake.
Of course, when intelligence operations originate from multiple sources, internal conflicts of interest and power struggles can lead to political strife. In many foreign cases, such as the UK, domestic and overseas intelligence are consolidated. However, such a method does not align well with our circumstances, and we have experienced numerous problems whenever we have consolidated them in the past.
Therefore, instead of blindly maintaining a single channel for overseas intelligence gathering, we must find a solution to the recent "Defense Security Command black agent leak" by cultivating agents for covert overseas intelligence through multiple channels and ensuring that organizations with separate personnel authorities cooperate and provide mutual verification.
The second security issue is the excessive obsession with reaching "$20 billion in defense exports." South Korea's defense exports had struggled to break the $3 billion barrier for the past decade or so, before surging to $7.3 billion in 2021 and $17.3 billion in 2022, though the upward trend slowed slightly to $13 billion in 2023.
In this situation, the current administration has set a "2024 $20 billion defense export" goal since the beginning of the year, with the Presidential Office ordering the government and defense firms to "go all-out" for defense exports. As early as June, the Presidential Office presided over the '5th Defense Export Strategy Evaluation Meeting' and publicly declared its commitment to strategically supporting the exploration of overseas markets for defense companies.
I cannot shake the suspicion that the "$20 billion defense export" figure is not intended for enhancing our national defense capability or developing the defense industry. The fundamental purpose of the defense industry is more important than numbers.
The primary purpose of defense exports is to break through the limitations of the domestic market—where order volumes and profitability are insufficient—and to secure growth engines for the industry. The second purpose is to ensure the safety of our allies or partner nations through our excellent weapon systems and contribute to international peace. Finally, through exports, economic feasibility is secured and the firms' own R&D capabilities are enhanced, which, as a result, allows us to provide better weapons to our own military at lower costs.
In other words, while it is good for the government, led by the Presidential Office, to join forces with companies to compete in export markets to expand defense sales, we must accelerate exports while remaining within the international order and avoiding transactions that could become legal liabilities.
We go "all-in" on the defense industry to protect the growth of the industry and national security, not to cause adverse effects on our defense industry or national security through these exports.
Of course, I have consistently argued that we must be considerate of and support the circumstances of importing nations for the sake of defense exports, and I hold the firm belief that this should be pursued even if it goes against some domestic public opinion. Many of the "unfavorable terms for Korea" in defense cooperation with Poland or Indonesia that our citizens criticize are actually common occurrences that other countries often experience when exporting. However, adhering to international norms is a different matter.
China is a representative country that does not abide by these lines, and China's reckless defense exports have resulted in worsening relations with Western nations and shrinking its own diplomatic standing. For example, when China showed signs of illegally transferring missile technology to Middle Eastern countries in December 2021, US CNN reported on it, and US President Biden announced that he would sanction the organizations involved.
The final security issue to focus on is cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare is a new concept of warfare often confused with psychological warfare. While they are similar in that they are military operations related to human psychology, they differ in many aspects.
The core concept of cognitive warfare is based on the assumption that human behavior and minds can be manipulated through our current cognitive science, psychology, and brain science. It refers to actions taken—whether before or after a war breaks out—to change human perception and judgment in favor of our side and to the detriment of the enemy.
Simply put, it means utilizing advanced marketing techniques and organizational management techniques in war and combat. For instance, current cognitive warfare involves producing and mass-disseminating information that lowers the credibility of enemy leadership to break their morale, exaggerating our military power to induce fear in the enemy, and obstructing the enemy's military command from making sound decisions, causing them to launch unnecessary operations or fail to execute critical strategies, all while making the enemy believe this information is true.
The concept of cognitive warfare has been advocated primarily by the US for several years now. It is known that hostile nations are also actively using it. A famous example of peacetime cognitive warfare is Russia spreading fake news on social networks to interfere in the US presidential election. Cognitive warfare is also being used extensively in the ongoing Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war.
Our military has also recently been paying attention to these cognitive warfare trends, with many studies and efforts underway. The problem is that, unlike psychological warfare, this concept of cognitive warfare must be used not only against enemy nations but also toward our own people. In a cognitive warfare situation, we must actively promote the importance and activities of our forces to the public. In fact, after the start of the Ukraine war, President Zelenskyy released live internet broadcasts of himself walking the streets of Kyiv to ease public anxiety.
The problem is that this is linked to politics, requiring cautious choices and actions. For example, in the Israel-Hamas war, Israel paid for advertisements on social networks to show videos of citizens suffering from Hamas attacks, showing great performance in cognitive warfare, but is currently being overwhelmingly pushed back by Hamas.
While pro-Israel and anti-Israel protests were evenly matched across the globe in the early stages of the war, anti-Israel protests are now spreading and continuing worldwide. It is also difficult for governments around the world to easily sympathize with Israel.
The reason Israel, which initially had the upper hand in cognitive warfare, is eventually losing ground is simple: it focused on regime security instead of the war objective of conducting the war. To be recognized by the international community, one must talk about one's own damage and hardships, but to protect the regime, one must convince far-right forces that this war is attractive. Since the focus of cognitive warfare was placed on the latter rather than the former, we must closely observe how Israel is receiving the wrath of Palestinian citizens and the international community. We, too, could fall into such a situation.
I have summarized the 3 major security issues we are currently facing. Although these three issues may appear to be separate, they are actually interconnected. I hope that our security policy will be formulated with the understanding that focusing only on immediate issues and short-term goals could ultimately cause significant damage to our national interests.